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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT
AND ITS REMEDY *
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK **
The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine recognizes the right to a jury trial of
facts that increase criminal sentences. The doctrine has had only a minimal effect
on sentencing because subsequent cases crafting a remedy largely undermined the
right. The remedial cases have undermined the Sixth Amendment sentencing
right in three notable ways: (1) by repeatedly refusing to recognize that district
courts possess an unfettered power to sentence based on nothing more than a
policy disagreement; (2) by encouraging appellate court judges to review
sentences in a manner that is designed to curtail district court discretion; and
(3) by refusing to require district court judges to engage in any independent
sentencing analysis. Although the Supreme Court has justified its remedy by
reference to historical sentencing practices, these three choices in its remedial
cases represent significant departures from historical practice. What is more, the
current remedy fails to vindicate the interests protected by the Sixth
Amendment—the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic input
into individual criminal cases. Until and unless the Court revisits its remedial
decisions, the Sixth Amendment sentencing right will continue to be little more
than a meaningless formalism.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Apprendi v. New Jersey ushered in a new doctrine of constitutional criminal
procedure: the right to a jury trial of facts that increase criminal sentences. In
the twenty years since Apprendi was decided, the Supreme Court has heard more
than a dozen cases that further develop the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine. 2 But the doctrine has not resulted in a system in which juries actually
decide sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt with any regularity.
Especially in the federal system, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has
increased the authority of judges, but it has largely failed to protect the rights
of defendants.
Not only has the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine not resulted in
more jury trials, but the doctrine also has been largely hollowed out in a number
of cases decided after Apprendi—cases that crafted a remedy for violations of the
Sixth Amendment sentencing right. Specifically, by creating an “advisory”
federal sentencing guideline system, the Supreme Court has dramatically
undermined the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. The Court has recalibrated
that federal remedy to encourage particular sentencing outcomes 3 and, in so
doing, has permitted practices that its earlier Sixth Amendment sentencing
cases seemingly prohibit. Put simply, the Supreme Court has allowed its
remedy to undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right.
The tension between the right and the remedy can be traced to two
choices—the choice to preserve an important role for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”), and the choice to embrace history as a justification
for, but not a limitation on, the remedy. In attempting to preserve a central role
for the Guidelines, the Court has significantly weakened the Sixth Amendment
sentencing right. The Court appears to require judges not only to make the
factual findings required by the Guidelines but also to make additional factual
findings in order to deviate from the Guidelines’ sentencing range—a

1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2019) (plurality opinion); ChavezMeza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967–68 (2018); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1897, 1911 (2018); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016); Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. 99, 114–15 (2013); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544 (2013); S. Union Co. v.
United States, 567 U.S. 343, 360 (2012); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504–05 (2011); Dillon
v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 830 (2010); Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per
curium); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (per curium); Irizarry v. United States,
553 U.S. 708, 716 (2008); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007); Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 59–60 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007); Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007).
3. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550 (“The Booker remedy was designed, and has been subsequently
calibrated, to exploit precisely this distinction: It is intended to promote sentencing uniformity while
avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation.”).
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requirement that is forbidden by the early cases establishing the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine. 4
The Supreme Court relied on history to justify the remedy that it
adopted—specifically, it relied on a long history of judges making factual
findings in aid of their independent sentencing decisions. But the Court has
failed to use that history as a guide or as a constraint when it has refined that
remedy in subsequent cases. As a result of this failure, the Court’s remedy has
become entirely unmoored from its original justification, and the Court has
permitted or endorsed sentencing practices that look nothing like the practices
it used to initially justify the remedy. Indeed, at this point, federal sentencing
more closely resembles the mandatory sentencing practices that have been
deemed unconstitutional than the unstructured sentencing that the Court relied
on in claiming that advisory sentencing guidelines satisfy the Sixth
Amendment.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the rise of
structured sentencing in the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s initial
articulation of the Sixth Amendment sentencing right in Apprendi, and the
Court’s subsequent expansion of that right. Part II turns from the right to the
remedy. It explains how three key features of the remedy—the unwillingness
to recognize district courts’ authority to sentence based on policy disagreements
with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric nature of appellate review, and the
failure to ensure district courts are exercising independent sentencing
judgment—undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right. Part III
highlights the strange role that history has played in the crafting of the Sixth
Amendment remedy—namely that history has served as a justification for, but
not a limitation on, the remedy. Part III explains that the three features of the
remedy discussed in Part II represent departures from historical practice. It also
explains how the current remedy fails to vindicate the interests protected by the
Sixth Amendment—the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic
input in individual criminal cases. Indeed, to a certain extent, the current system
undermines those principles.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING RIGHT
For much of American history, criminal statutes identified broad ranges
of punishment, and judges were free to impose a punishment from anywhere
within that range. 5 For example, a state might criminalize assault and make the
4. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
5. The early history of sentencing in the United States—in particular, when sentencing switched
from a system of determinate sentences to a system that gave sentencing discretion to judges—is a
matter of some dispute. Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
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violation of that law punishable by up to five years in prison. When a defendant
was convicted of assault, the judge in that case decided whether to impose a
sentence of no incarceration, five years of incarceration, or something in
between.
The precise sentence in a particular case was left almost entirely to the
discretion of judges. 6 The judge was tasked with finding any facts relevant to
the defendant’s sentence—such as whether the defendant had committed
previous crimes or how much harm the victim suffered. The judge was also
responsible for deciding how those facts ought to affect the sentence. 7 The judge
had to decide for example, whether an eighteen-year-old defendant should serve
a lengthy sentence because young people are more likely to reoffend, or whether
the defendant should serve a shorter sentence because young people are less
culpable for their crimes. Finally, judges’ sentencing decisions were usually
exempted from any meaningful appellate review. 8
Importantly, the judge was not the only official who played a significant
role in deciding a defendant’s punishment. When defendants were sentenced to
incarceration, they rarely served the full sentence that the judge imposed. 9
Instead, they were periodically assessed by parole officials who would release

used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed
by law.”), and KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998) (“From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were
entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”), with Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892 (1990) (“[U]p through
1870, legislators retained most of the discretionary power over criminal sentencing. . . . [T]he period
of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature.”), and Note, The
Admissibility of Character Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 715–16 (1942)
(“During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries American criminal legislation has shifted from the
fixed sentence type of criminal statute to the discretionary sentence type of statute.” (footnote
omitted)). But everyone seems to agree that discretionary sentencing was the norm by the late
nineteenth century.
6. For an excellent historical account of judicial sentencing discretion and how judges wielded
that discretion, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9–29.
7. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst,
66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 474 (2019) (explaining that before the rise of structured sentencing, judges
“enjoyed the ability to make factual findings in aid of their sentencing decisions” because “people
believed that it was impossible to identify ex ante those facts that ought to increase or decrease
sentences”—a task that was also left to judicial discretion).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 147–60.
9. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (1999) (“In the early 1970’s, States generally
permitted parole boards to determine when an offender would be released from prison. In addition,
good-time reductions for satisfactory prison behavior, earned-time incentives for participation in work
or educational programs, and other time reductions to control prison crowding resulted in the early
release of prisoners. These policies permitted officials to individualize the amount of punishment or
leniency an offender received and provided means to manage the prison population.”).
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defendants back into the community when it appeared that they had been
sufficiently rehabilitated. 10
Over time, the discretion that judges enjoyed at sentencing came under
attack. Driven by concerns about the disparities resulting from highly
discretionary sentencing practices—which dovetailed with concerns about
increasing crime rates and broad criticisms of the rehabilitative model of
punishment—criminal justice experts and scholars proposed reforms to bring
greater consistency and certainty to the sentencing enterprise. 11
Federal sentencing reform focused heavily on curtailing judicial
sentencing discretion. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) 12 created a
sentencing commission to develop mandatory guidelines that limited the
available sentencing range in particular cases. 13 The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines assign narrow sentencing ranges within the broader statutory
sentencing limits based on a number of factual variables, including the offense
of conviction, the factual circumstances surrounding the offense, and the
defendant’s prior criminal convictions. 14 Judges were permitted to sentence
outside the Guidelines range only in a few situations expressly permitted by the
Guidelines 15 or where the sentencing judge found that a circumstance had not
been “taken into consideration” when the Guidelines were drafted. 16
The federal government was hardly unique in its decision to adopt
structured sentencing mechanisms. Some states developed their own sentencing
guidelines, while others adopted presumptive sentencing regimes. 17 In those
presumptive systems, legislatures or sentencing commissions identified a
narrow presumptive sentence for the “ordinary case” of a given crime. Judges
retained the power to sentence above or below the presumptive sentence in an

10. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 958, 976–87 (2013) (describing the history of and rationale behind parole in America).
11. For examples of such proposed reforms, see MODEL SENT’G & CORR. ACT § 3 (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 1979); DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS 193–99 (2d ed. 1975); PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E.
CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM 96–127 (1977); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 15–34 (1976).
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C.).
13. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017–20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2), (c), (d).
15. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (identifying
appropriate and inappropriate grounds for departure).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 102–03 (noting that
before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this provision severely hampered district court
ability to sentence below the Guidelines range).
17. See John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review: Booker in the States, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 683, 688 (2009) (discussing different types of sentencing reforms in the states).
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unusual case, but those sentencing decisions were subject to appellate review. 18
Examples of such systems include Arizona, California, and Washington, which
created presumptive, mitigated, and aggravated sentences. 19
Mandatory sentencing guidelines and presumptive sentencing systems
were adopted only by a minority of jurisdictions. 20 Other jurisdictions curtailed
judicial sentencing discretion through the use of mandatory minimum
sentences. Some jurisdictions simply created new crimes with statutory
mandatory minimum sentences. Whatever factual circumstance warranted the
mandatory minimum sentence was included as an element of the new offense. 21
But creating new crimes was not the only approach to imposing mandatory
sentences. Other systems treated the fact or facts triggering a mandatory
minimum sentence purely as a sentencing matter to be decided by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than as an element of a new crime. 22
Sentencing reform in the late twentieth century not only curtailed the
authority of judges but also affected parole. The federal system 23 and some
states 24 abandoned parole altogether in the name of “truth in sentencing.” 25 And
those states that retained parole changed their laws so that many crimes were
either no longer parole eligible or required defendants to serve lengthy
mandatory sentences before becoming eligible. 26
When first confronted with these developments in the 1980s, the Supreme
Court gave them its blessing. It upheld the Guidelines against a separation of
powers attack in Mistretta v. United States. 27 And in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 28
it rejected due process and Sixth Amendment challenges to so-called sentencing
18. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Review
Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 647 n.10 (1993). The presumptive sentence often depends not
only on the offense of conviction but also on an offender’s prior record of convictions.
19. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-604, 13-702 (Westlaw through end of the 48th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. 2007); CAL. R. CT. 4.420 (Westlaw 2006) (amended 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.535 (Westlaw 2002); see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 276–77 (2007)
(describing the California system).
20. See Pfaff, supra note 17, at 688–89 (explaining that only eighteen states adopted structured
sentencing systems that “set default sentences or ranges from which a judge cannot depart (either up
or down) without making some sort of additional factual finding,” though others adopted voluntary
guidelines that “judges are simply encouraged, not required, to follow”).
21. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1999) (collecting examples of states
that created a new offense, “aggravated robbery,” which required the defendant to have caused serious
bodily injury, an element that was not required to convict for ordinary robbery).
22. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 8, 1982, Act No. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Laws 169 (codified as amended at 42
PA. CONST. STAT. § 9712 (Westlaw 1982)).
23. Doherty, supra note 10, at 995–96.
24. Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741,
2747 (2020) (noting that from 1972 to 2007 “sixteen states abolished parole-release discretion”).
25. See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 9, at 1.
26. Reitz, supra note 24, at 2752.
27. 488 U.S. 361 (1989); id. at 371, 374.
28. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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factors. 29 The challenge in McMillan involved a state statute that imposed a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendants convicted of certain
felonies if they possessed a firearm during the commission of their offense.
Whether the defendant possessed a firearm was, according to the statute, to be
determined by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. 30 That is to say,
the possession of a firearm was not considered an element to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, it was only a factor for the judge to
consider at sentencing in determining whether the mandatory minimum
applied. The Supreme Court deferred to the Pennsylvania legislature’s decision
to alter the range of punishment by creating a statutory sentencing factor rather
than by making possession of the firearm either a new element of the crime or
a new offense. 31 The Court further held that there is no jury trial right to
sentencing, even when a sentence turns on finding a specific fact. 32
Fewer than fifteen years after affirming the constitutionality of sentencing
factors in McMillan, the Supreme Court changed course. In Apprendi, the Court
said these sentencing practices were limited by the Sixth Amendment. 33
Apprendi was the first time the Court ruled these practices unconstitutional, but
it had signaled its concerns about altering a defendant’s sentencing range based
on judicial fact-finding the previous year in Jones v. United States. 34 Jones raised
the question whether a federal carjacking statute—which increased the statutory
maximum punishment if the defendant caused serious bodily injury or death—
created new federal crimes or merely new sentencing factors. Writing for the
majority, Justice Souter explained that increasing the statutory maximum
sentence based on judge-found facts raised serious constitutional questions,
including questions regarding the defendant’s right to a jury trial. 35 To avoid
those questions, the Court elected to construe the statute as creating new federal
crimes rather than new federal sentencing factors. 36
The questions the Court avoided in Jones were squarely presented in
Apprendi. Apprendi involved a state statutory sentencing enhancement similar to
the sentencing factor at issue in McMillan. But unlike McMillian, the
enhancement in Apprendi increased the maximum sentence for defendants,
rather than imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. The enhancement
applied to defendants convicted of the unlawful possession of a firearm if they

29. Id. at 91, 93.
30. Act of Mar. 8, 1982, Act No. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Laws 169 (codified as amended at 42 PA.
CONST. STAT. § 9712 (Westlaw 1982)); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
31. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86.
32. Id. at 93.
33. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
34. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
35. Id. at 240–51.
36. Id. at 251–52.
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possessed the firearm in order to intimidate someone because of their race. 37
That factual finding—whether the defendant committed the crime to intimidate
the victim based on race—was decided by the sentencing judge using a
preponderance of the evidence standard. 38 The Apprendi Court struck down the
statute. It held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt. 39
In striking down the New Jersey statute, the Apprendi Court cast doubt on
McMillan, which had affirmed the constitutionality of statutory sentencing
factors involving judicial fact-finding. The Apprendi Court characterized the
“distinction between ‘elements’ and ‘sentencing factors’” as “constitutionally
novel and elusive.” 40 The Court elected to distinguish between elements (which
require jury fact-finding) and sentencing factors (which do not) by focusing on
the effect of the statutory punishment enhancement. The Apprendi Court stated,
“the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding
expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s
guilty verdict?” 41 Applying this “effect over form” framework to the New Jersey
statute, the Court concluded that “the effect of New Jersey’s sentencing
‘enhancement’ here is unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a
first-degree offense, under the State’s own criminal code.” 42
Put simply, Apprendi stated that whether a fact is an element, and thus
subject to the Sixth Amendment, turns on what that fact does. If a fact increases
the statutory maximum sentence by reclassifying a crime under the state’s
criminal code, then the fact is the functional equivalent of an element. But if a
fact merely “supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s
finding,” then it is a sentencing factor, and the Sixth Amendment does not
apply. 43

37. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 476. The Apprendi Court exempted previous convictions from its ruling because two
years before, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), it had held that prior
convictions that increase punishments need not be submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 239.
40. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 494 n.19 (“This is not to suggest that the term ‘sentencing factor’ is devoid of meaning.
The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in
character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the
defendant is guilty of a particular offense. On the other hand, when the term ‘sentence enhancement’
is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict. Indeed,
it fits squarely within the usual definition of an ‘element’ of the offense.”).
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Apprendi was groundbreaking in its establishment of the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine. But when that doctrine was first announced, the
importance of the ruling was not immediately clear. Because the Court limited
the rule announced in Apprendi to increases in statutory maximum sentences,
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine did not appear to reach sentencing
guidelines. But Ring v. Arizona 44 expanded the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine beyond statutory maxima—and in doing so, ensured that the doctrine
would have a much broader effect. 45
Ring involved a Sixth Amendment challenge to Arizona’s capital
sentencing regime. Arizona law permitted the imposition of the death penalty
only in the presence of certain aggravating circumstances, and it assigned the
task of finding those aggravating circumstances to the trial judge, not the jury. 46
Because the relevant statute said that the maximum penalty was death, 47 the
new rule announced in Apprendi arguably did not apply. The judge was merely
choosing whether to impose the maximum sentence of death or a lesser
sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court had said as much in Apprendi when it
explained why the rule it announced was not foreclosed by a prior decision
upholding the Arizona death penalty regime against constitutional attack. 48
But the Ring Court rejected that reading of Apprendi. It relied on language
from Apprendi indicating that the relevant constitutional question was whether
the judicial fact finding increased the sentence a defendant could receive above
the maximum sentence she could receive if he were “punished according to the
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” 49 Because a judge could legally impose
the death penalty only after finding one or more aggravating factors identified
in the statute, the Court concluded that those “enumerated aggravating factors
operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.’” 50 And
thus the Sixth Amendment applied.
It bears emphasizing that Ring could have gone the other way. Unlike the
New Jersey statute in Apprendi, the statute at issue in Ring explicitly stated that
the maximum punishment for first-degree murder was death. The Supreme
44. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
45. See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 322 (2016) (stating that Ring clarified
that Apprendi was not “a drafting rule” and as a result, “Ring would prove to be the intellectual forebear
of Blakely”); Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 455–56 (explaining how Ring expanded the rule from
Apprendi, but that expansion was not acknowledged until Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)).
46. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 592–93 (describing the Arizona capital sentencing system).
47. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(C) (Westlaw 2001).
48. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 (“[O]nce a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements
of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to
decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.” (quoting
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted))).
49. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588–89 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
50. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
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Court could have distinguished the statute in Ring from the statute in Apprendi
on those grounds. But, once again, the Court focused on the effect of the statute,
not merely what the statute said. Life in prison was the maximum penalty that
Timothy Ring could receive based on his conviction alone. 51 Unless and until
the judge found an aggravating circumstance, the judge could not sentence him
to death. And this, according to the Ring Court, violated the Sixth
Amendment. 52
An acknowledgment of the full effect of Ring—and arguably the highwater mark of the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine—came soon after in
Blakely v. Washington. 53 Decided only four years after Apprendi and two years
after Ring, Blakely extended the Sixth Amendment sentencing right to
sentencing guidelines. The Blakely Court held that mandatory sentencing
guidelines can violate the Sixth Amendment if a judge’s sentencing discretion
is limited to a range narrower than the statutory range and if the sentencing
range can increase only if the sentencing court makes factual findings. The
Blakely Court explained that mandatory guidelines fell within the Apprendi rule
because “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict
or admitted by the defendant.” 54 The Blakely Court went on to clarify that
the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not
found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,”
and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 55
Blakely did not merely acknowledge the full effect of the Ring decision. It
also expanded the doctrine beyond what the Court had previously set forth in
Apprendi and Ring. In particular, it no longer relied, as an analytical matter, on
the analogy to statutory elements that created new, aggravated crimes. That
analogy worked in both Apprendi and Ring because those cases involved
sentencing factors that were specifically identified in statutes. Those identified
factors increased the maximum available sentence, and so the Apprendi and Ring
Courts said that the factors operated as the functional equivalent of an element.
But the state sentencing scheme at issue in Blakely did not limit judges to a finite
list of aggravating factors. The list that appeared in the statute was “illustrative
51. Id. at 597 (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony
murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment.”).
52. Id. at 609.
53. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
54. Id. at 303.
55. Id. at 303–04 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1866)).
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only and . . . not intended to be exclusive.” 56 In other words, judges had to find
aggravating factors in order to impose a higher sentence, but judges could also
decide what those factors could be.
It is difficult to analogize this abstract fact-finding requirement to an
element of a crime. Indeed, if a legislature enacted a criminal statute that
imposed additional punishment on people who did something “aggravating” or
“exceptional,” the courts might strike down such a statute as unconstitutionally
vague. 57 Rather than resembling an element of a crime, the idea that sentences
on the higher end of the statutory range should be imposed only when there are
“substantial and compelling reasons” 58 to do so seems like common sense.
Indeed, that is presumably why legislatures enact criminal statutes with
statutory ranges rather than single, fixed penalties—to permit judges to impose
sentences at or near the top of the statutory range for those defendants who do
things that make their crimes seem worse and lower sentences for those
defendants who do not.
But the Blakely Court decided that any fact-finding requirement triggered
the Sixth Amendment, regardless whether particular, previously determined
facts had to be found. Imagine, for example, a statute said that judges should
impose sentences above the presumptive range only if they first find
“aggravating facts,” and the statutes gave a nonexhaustive list of three
aggravating facts—whether the defendant used a gun, whether the victim
suffered a physical injury, and whether the defendant had previously been
convicted of the same crime. In this hypothetical regime, a particular judge
could decide that committing a crime in the presence of a minor is also an
aggravating fact and then impose a sentence above the presumptive range on a
specific defendant after finding that the defendant had committed the crime in
front of a child. Following Blakely, such a sentence violates the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine because it requires additional fact-finding:

56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390 (Westlaw 2000).
57. It is possible, but by no means certain, that such an element would be deemed
unconstitutionally vague. While the Court has sometimes deemed qualitative standards impermissibly
vague, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983), it has also rejected vagueness challenges to
such standards, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279–80 (1984). The Court’s cases in this area are
simply not consistent. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules,
97 WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 371–72 (2019) (noting the inconsistency between United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), and Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)). And the Court has
recently stated that qualitative standards, standing alone, are not enough to render a statute
unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 603–04 (2015) (“As a general
matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative
standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct . . . .”).
58. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“Under the [Washington sentencing
system], a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range for the offense unless the court
finds substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”), rev’d sub nom. Blakely,
542 U.S. 296.
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Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends
on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of several specified facts
(as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the
jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires
that authority only upon finding some additional fact. 59
Following Blakely, it was clear that the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine had fundamentally undermined the constitutionality of structured
sentencing, including the Guidelines. 60 Because the Guidelines required judges
to find facts in order to determine the applicable Guidelines range, the federal
system clearly violated the rule articulated in Ring and Blakely—that a jury must
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts that increase a defendant’s sentencing
exposure. And so, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory Guidelines
were unconstitutional in United States v. Booker. 61
Notably, the Guidelines were not mandatory in all circumstances. Judges
were permitted to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range if they found
“that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described.” 62 But the Booker majority dismissed this authority to sentence
outside the Guidelines because it was “not available in every case, and in fact
[was] unavailable in most.” 63 Because judges were required to sentence within
the Guidelines in a “run-of-the-mill” case, the Court deemed the Guidelines’
mandatory rules that increased criminal penalties based on judicial factfinding. 64
The Supreme Court confirmed that any required fact-finding by judges
violated the Sixth Amendment doctrine in Cunningham v. California. 65 That case
involved California’s statutory sentencing system which, like the Washington
system at issue in Blakely, was a presumptive sentencing system. 66 Despite that
key similarity, the Supreme Court of California relied on the intervening

59. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.
60. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines Are Dead! Long Live Sentencing
Guidelines!, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 25, 2004, 12:43 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/06/sentencing_guid.html [https://perma.cc/9FZM-LEVK] (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely seems to mean that the standard operating procedures for most
sentencing guideline systems—including those of the federal sentencing guidelines—are no longer
constitutionally sound.”).
61. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (merits majority).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234.
64. Id. at 235.
65. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19; see also Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277–79 (describing
the California system).
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decision in Booker to decide that its sentencing system had survived Blakely. 67
The unusual remedy the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted in Booker had created
confusion about what sort of judicial sentencing discretion could avoid
triggering the Sixth Amendment—an issue that I take up at some length below.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of California.
While declining to further clarify the amount of discretion that federal judges
enjoyed in the wake of Booker, the Cunningham Court reiterated that because
the California system required judges to make factual findings in order to
increase sentences, it violated the rule set out in Blakely. 68 In so holding, the
Court rejected Justice Alito’s contention in dissent that, as the majority put it,
“a policy judgment, or even a judge’s ‘subjective belief’ regarding the
appropriate sentence, qualifies as an aggravating circumstance” under the
California system. 69 The majority pointed to statutory language making clear
that the term “circumstances in aggravation” was defined as “facts which justify
the imposition of the upper prison term.” 70
Since deciding Blakely and Cunningham, the Court has, on several
occasions, further expanded the doctrine. The doctrine, as originally
formulated, initially applied only to increases in the maximum punishment; it
did not forbid the adoption of sentencing factors that triggered a mandatory
minimum sentence. 71 But in Alleyne v. United States, 72 the Court extended the
doctrine to mandatory minimum punishments as well, holding that any factual
finding that increases the required minimum punishment also must be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleyne was not the first case to address whether the rule from Apprendi
applied to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court took up the question two
years after Apprendi in Harris v. United States. 73 The Harris Court refused to
apply the rule from Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court
justified its decision on several grounds. First, it noted that Apprendi had relied
on the distinction between maximum and minimum sentences in reconciling its
holding with McMillan. 74 Second, it noted that the mandatory minimum was
already within the range of permissible sentencing without any additional factfinding, and so defendants did not have a right to be sentenced below the
mandatory minimum. 75
67. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 536 (Cal. 2005), overruled by Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270.
68. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 288–89.
69. Id. at 279 (citing id. at 307–08 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
70. Id. (quoting CAL. R. CT. 4.405(d) (Westlaw 2006) (amended 2007)).
71. E.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99 (2013).
72. 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
73. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99.
74. Id. at 562–65.
75. Id. at 566.
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The Alleyne Court rejected this analysis and overruled Harris. It reframed
the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine as a simple test: “Any fact that, by
law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” 76 The Court then explained that
adding or increasing a mandatory minimum sentence is an increase in the
penalty for that crime because it “alter[s] the prescribed range of sentences to
which a defendant is exposed . . . in a manner that aggravates the punishment.” 77
The Alleyne Court bolstered this conclusion with historical evidence. 78 It also
stated that its new rule would allow defendants to predict their sentencing range
based on the charges in an indictment, and it would “preserve[] the historic role
of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal defendants.” 79
The Supreme Court has also applied the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine to situations other than the calculation of sentences of incarceration.
In Southern Union Co. v. United States, 80 the Court extended the doctrine to any
factual findings that are necessary to the calculation of a criminal fine. And in
United States v. Haymond, 81 the Court applied the doctrine to a mandatory
sentence that was imposed in a supervised-release revocation hearing.
But at the same time the Court has expanded the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine, it has also dramatically undercut the doctrine. The biggest
blow to the doctrine has been the remedy that the Court adopted in Booker.
That is the subject of the next part.
II. UNDERMINING THE RIGHT WITH THE REMEDY
In United States v. Booker, five Justices agreed that the federal system,
which was based on mandatory sentencing guidelines, violated the Sixth
Amendment. 82 But a different five-Justice majority determined how to fix the
problem. 83 This remedial majority was unwilling to submit the Guidelines’
factual findings to a jury. The remedial majority was concerned that if the Court
required juries to find sentencing facts, then parties would engage in plea
bargaining over those facts. Plea bargaining over sentencing facts could lead to
different sentencing outcomes in cases with similar facts—differences driven by
lawyers’ negotiating skills rather than differences that ought to drive sentences.
Because Congress enacted the SRA to reduce sentencing disparities, the
remedial majority thought that allowing plea bargaining over sentencing facts
76. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 102 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10, 490 (2000)).
77. Id. at 108 (first citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000); and then citing
Harris, 536 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
78. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108–11.
79. Id. at 114 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995)).
80. 567 U.S. 343 (2012).
81. 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality opinion).
82. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (merits majority).
83. Id. at 244–46 (remedial majority).
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would be inconsistent with congressional intent. 84 Thus, instead of requiring
federal prosecutors to submit sentencing enhancements to a jury, the remedial
majority decided to make the Guidelines “advisory,” rather than mandatory. 85
“Advisory” guidelines, the Court explained, would not violate the Sixth
Amendment right because they “recommended, rather than required, the
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts.” 86
Sentencing judges had long enjoyed the discretion to select particular sentences
from within broad statutory ranges, and the Sixth Amendment sentencing cases
have frequently affirmed that such discretion is constitutional, even though
judges doubtlessly made factual findings when deciding what sentences to
impose. 87 As a result, the Booker Court reasoned, a system that restored
sentencing discretion to judges could remedy the Sixth Amendment problem
with the Guidelines. 88
Of course, giving trial judges sentencing discretion would hardly protect
against sentencing disparity. If judges could ignore the Guidelines, then they
could impose the same disparate sentences that they had prior to the SRA. And
so the remedial majority sought to preserve a central role for the Guidelines. It
did this by imposing two additional limitations to promote sentencing
uniformity. First, it required sentencing judges to begin each sentencing by
calculating the correct Guidelines range. Judges were instructed to “consider”
that range in selecting a sentence, along with other factors identified in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 89 Those § 3553(a) factors include the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
the seriousness of the offense, the need to deter to criminal conduct, and the
need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. The second
limitation that the Court imposed was appellate review of sentencing decisions.
Appellate courts were instructed to reverse “unreasonable” sentences in order
to “iron out” differences in sentencing decisions. 90
As I have explained elsewhere, 91 there is a fundamental tension between
granting district courts discretion and preserving a central role for the
84. Id. at 255–58.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Id. at 233 (merits majority).
87. E.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting the history of judges’ broad
discretion in sentencing within statutory limits).
88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (remedial majority).
89. Id. at 259–60.
90. Id. at 261–63.
91. Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent Recommendations
To “Strengthen the Guidelines System”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2014) (“[T]hese two goals—
adherence to the Guidelines and district court discretion—are fundamentally in tension with one
another.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 717, 741 (2009) [hereinafter Hessick, After Kimbrough] (noting “the precarious balance
the Court is attempting to strike between district court sentencing discretion and the preservation of
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Guidelines. The raison d’etre for the Guidelines is to limit district court
discretion and create sentencing uniformity. The Booker opinion gave little
guidance regarding how the remedy would strike a balance between these two
seemingly incompatible goals. But in subsequent decisions, it has become clear
that the Booker remedy is intended to ensure that most sentences still fall within
the Guidelines range (or very close to it). What is more, the discretion that
district court judges have—specifically, their discretion not to follow the
Guidelines—is not nearly as great as the Booker opinion suggested that it would
be.
In tilting the balance of its remedy toward the Guidelines and away from
district court discretion, the Supreme Court has hollowed out the Sixth
Amendment sentencing right. Indeed, the Court appears to have created
tension—if not irreconcilable conflict—with its earlier Sixth Amendment cases.
As described in more detail below, there are three deeply problematic aspects
of the post-Booker cases: First, the Court has repeatedly refused to recognize
that district courts possess an unfettered power to sentence outside of the
Guidelines range based on nothing more than a policy disagreement. Second,
the Court has encouraged appellate court judges to review sentences in a
manner it openly admits is designed to curtail district court discretion in order
to have more sentences conform to the Guidelines. Third, while the Court has
repeatedly reversed sentences that incorrectly calculate the Guidelines range, it
has refused to require district court judges to engage in any independent
sentencing analysis.
A.

Policy Disagreement

In two early sentencing cases, the Court made clear that the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine applied to any factual findings, not merely
those findings that are identified in the relevant statutes or guidelines. In
Blakely, the Court said that the Washington sentencing system was
unconstitutional because it required a judge to make a factual finding in order
to increase a defendant’s sentence above the presumptive sentencing range. 92 In
Cunningham, the Court indicated that, so long as a judge was free to increase a
defendant’s sentence based on a policy judgment or the judge’s “subjective
belief” regarding the appropriate sentence, then the Sixth Amendment did not
apply. 93

some adherence to the Guidelines through appellate review” and describing those goals as being in
tension with one another); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“These two objectives—requiring district court discretion and
cabining that discretion through reasonableness review—are in tension with each other.”).
92. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70.
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Despite these early opinions about the scope of the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine, in the wake of Booker, the Supreme Court has resisted
stating that federal judges are always free to sentence above or below the
Guidelines range based on anything other than factual findings. It is difficult to
square this resistance with a right that does not permit mandatory judicial factfinding to increase sentences.
The Court first confronted this issue two years after Booker in Kimbrough
v. United States. 94 Kimbrough involved a district court’s authority to sentence a
defendant outside of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement
with the policy underlying the crack-cocaine guideline. The government argued
that the guideline could not be disregarded because it was derived from
congressional policy. 95 The Kimbrough Court rejected that argument, holding
that district courts have the ability to sentence outside of the Guidelines range
based on a categorical disagreement with the disparity between crack and
cocaine. That is to say, district courts were free to base their sentencing
decisions on policy disagreements with the crack-cocaine guideline as opposed
to case-specific factual circumstances. 96
Although the Kimbrough Court held that district courts were free to
sentence outside the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the crackcocaine guideline, the Court suggested that there might be limits on the ability
of district courts to impose sentences based on policy disagreements with other
Guidelines. 97 The Court said that district courts were not constrained by the
crack-to-cocaine sentencing ratio because the crack-cocaine guideline “do[es]
not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional
role.” 98 In “formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses,” the Court
elaborated, “the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences . . .
and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national experience.’” 99 The
Court noted that “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s recommendation of a
sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’” 100 And, in such an ordinary case—that is, in a
case where the Guidelines in question do “exemplify the Commission’s exercise

94. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
95. Id. at 102 (citing Brief for the United States at 16, 25, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330)).
96. See id. at 109–10.
97. See id. at 108–09. Notably, the government’s brief in Kimbrough conceded that “the Guidelines
‘are now advisory’ and that, as a general matter, ‘courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely
on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.’” Id. at 101 (quoting Brief for
the United States at 16, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330)). But the Court did not adopt that
concession. Id. at 108–09.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Id. at 109–10 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring), vacated, 552 U.S. 1306 (2008)).
100. Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)).
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of its characteristic institutional role” 101—“closer review may be in order” when
a district court bases its decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on a
policy disagreement. 102
The Court reiterated the possibility of “closer review” in a subsequent
crack-cocaine case, Spears v. United States. 103 The Court once again repeated the
suggestion that policy disagreements are permitted for some Guidelines, but
not for others, in Pepper v. United States. 104 The Pepper Court stated that “a
district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based
on a disagreement with the Commission’s views. That is particularly true where,
as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales
not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.” 105 Endorsing district
court policy disagreement only in “appropriate” cases suggests that there are
cases in which district courts do not have the power to sentence outside the
Guidelines range on pure policy grounds.
This reading of Pepper as endorsing only limited district court authority to
sentence outside of the Guidelines for nonfactual reasons was confirmed in
Peugh v. United States. 106 Although Peugh did not involve a question of policy
disagreement, the opinion explicitly noted that whether a district court’s
decision to sentence outside Guidelines ranges based solely on policy
considerations is subject to heightened appellate review remains an open
question. 107
The Court has yet to explain what “closer review” might entail. District
court sentencing decisions are presently reviewed for “reasonableness,” which
the Court tells us is equivalent to abuse of discretion review. 108 “Closer review”
might mean that appellate courts need not accord any deference to the district
court’s sentencing decision, leaving them free to reverse whenever they would
have imposed a different sentence. But whatever “closer review” might mean,

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curium); id. at 264 (stating that a district court’s “‘inside the
heartland’ departure (which is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and
necessarily disagrees on a ‘categorical basis’) may be entitled to less respect”).
104. 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
105. Id. at 501 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10). At issue
in Pepper was whether a district court could impose a below-Guidelines sentence on a defendant based
on post-sentencing rehabilitation, even though a federal statute and a Commission policy statement
said that such evidence could not be considered at sentencing. Id. at 493, 500–01. The Pepper Court
held the federal statute unconstitutional, and it criticized the Commission policy statement. Id. at 497–
98, 501–02.
106. 569 U.S. 530 (2013).
107. Id. at 537 n.2.
108. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 11 (noting that the Supreme Court did not “equate
reasonableness review with the ‘familiar’ abuse of discretion standard” until after Booker).
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it is a clear signal to district courts that they are more likely to be reversed on
appeal.
Telling a district court that it is more likely to be reversed on appeal is not
very far removed from telling them that they are not permitted to do
something. A rule is still a rule even when it is enforced only through appellate
review rather than directly on district courts. Nor is it clear how one could
reconcile the idea of close appellate review with broad sentencing discretion.
After all, appellate review is, by its nature, a limit on district court discretion. 109
It may be necessary to dig deeper into what a “policy disagreement” means
to understand why it is so troubling that the Court has refused to say that
district courts may impose sentences based solely on policy disagreements with
the Guidelines. A so-called policy disagreement with the Guidelines occurs
when a judge imposes a non-Guidelines sentence, not because some fact or
circumstance made a Guidelines sentence unsuitable in a particular case, but
rather because the sentencing judge concluded that the sentence recommended
by the Guidelines is unsuitable in many or most cases. 110
Some examples may be helpful. If a judge decides to impose a lower
sentence because the defendant turned himself in to authorities and
immediately compensated the victim, then the judge has deviated from the
Guidelines based on facts and circumstances in the particular case. If a judge
decides to impose a lower sentence on an insider trading defendant because she
believes that the Commission generally set the sentences for white-collar
offenses too high, then the judge has deviated from the Guidelines based on a
policy disagreement. The same is true if the judge decides to impose a higher
sentence because she believes that the Commission generally set the sentences
for white-collar offenses too low. What makes a disagreement a policy
disagreement is that the judge is imposing a non-Guidelines sentence based on
a generalizable disagreement with the Commission rather than the specific facts
presented in a particular case.
The power to impose sentences based on policy disagreements with the
Guidelines seems like it is logically required by the Booker remedy. Recall, the
constitutional flaw in the mandatory federal sentencing regime prior to Booker
was that sentencing judges were permitted to impose certain sentences only
when they had made a factual finding. 111 If judges do not have the ability to
109. See id. at 29.
110. Cf. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009) (per curiam) (confirming that district
courts may reject and categorically vary from the crack-cocaine range suggested by the Guidelines even
in a “mine-run case where there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance
from the Guidelines’ sentencing range”).
111. At the time Booker was decided, the relevant limit on sentencing authority was whether the
judge could not impose a higher sentence without a factual finding. The Court has since decided that
factual findings which prohibit a judge from imposing a lower sentence also raise Sixth Amendment
problems. See supra text accompanying notes 53–72.

99 N.C. L. REV. 1195 (2021)

1214

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99-5

impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a policy disagreement, then they
must impose a Guidelines sentence unless they identify specific facts that
render a Guidelines sentence inappropriate. Indeed, the Court seems to have
admitted as much when it stated in Peugh that “‘a district court’s decision to
vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when’ it is based
on the particular facts of a case.” 112 But if policy disagreements are not allowed,
then the fatal constitutional flaw is reintroduced to the post-Booker sentencing
system.
Of course, allowing judges to sentence outside of the Guidelines range
based only on the facts and circumstances of a particular case does not return us
to the pre-Booker system. Prior to Booker, the only facts and circumstances that
mattered were those identified by the Guidelines. 113 But Blakely and
Cunningham tell us that turning more facts and circumstances into permissible
sentencing factors is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 114 Even if the
sentencing court were not limited to those facts and factors specifically listed in
the Guidelines, the judge would have to identify some fact about the defendant’s
crime or personal background that warranted a non-Guidelines sentence. 115 It
was the requirement of some factual finding—even when judges had the
authority to decide which facts would matter—that led the Supreme Court to
conclude that the Washington and California sentencing systems were
unconstitutional. So, if the Supreme Court were to conclude that federal judges
do not have the authority to base their sentences on policy disagreements, such
a conclusion would overrule Blakely and Cunningham.
To be clear, the Supreme Court has not affirmatively said that district
courts lack the authority to impose a sentence based on a policy disagreement
with the Guidelines. Instead, it has framed the issue as an open question. 116 But
given the Court’s rulings in Blakely and Cunningham, the question should be
considered entirely settled. And so one might suspect that the Court has
repeatedly said that this is an open question because it is trying to minimize the
number of judges who are willing to ignore the Guidelines on purely policy
grounds by warning them that they might get reversed on appeal. This
suspicion becomes more plausible when we read the Court’s ruminations about
“closer review” for policy disagreement in the context of other statements that
the Court has made about federal sentencing in the wake of Booker. In particular,

112. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 537 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)).
113. To be clear, judges could consider facts and circumstances that were not identified in the
Guidelines when selecting a sentence from within the narrow range identified by the Guidelines. But
those facts and circumstances were irrelevant to the selection of the narrow Guidelines range itself.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59, 65–70.
115. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1668–69
(2012).
116. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 537 n.2.
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the Court has said that it expects district court judges to impose Guidelines
sentences in most cases. 117
The Court also admits that its remedial cases were designed with the
intent of ensuring more Guidelines sentences. For example, in Peugh, the Court
said that “the federal sentencing regime after Booker” uses “procedural rules and
standards for appellate review” in order to “encourage[] district courts to
sentence within the guidelines.” 118 It also stated that “the post-Booker sentencing
regime puts in place procedural ‘hurdle[s]’ that, in practice, make the imposition
of a non-Guidelines sentence less likely.” 119
Although the Court has, on multiple occasions, said that district court
judges may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is appropriate, 120 it has also
said that district judges may rely on “the Guidelines range to instruct them
regarding the appropriate balance of the relevant federal sentencing factors.” 121
Personally, I do not understand how using the Guidelines range to “instruct”
oneself of the proper sentence is even remotely different than presuming that
the sentencing range is reasonable. And the Court never bothers to clarify.
These statements strongly suggest that the Court expects district courts to
impose non-Guidelines sentences only in unusual cases—that is, in cases where
the facts and circumstances warrant a different sentence. Since the Court
readily admits that it has consciously used “procedural rules and standards for
appellate review” to create more within-Guidelines sentences, 122 it is hard not
to suspect that they have left this question open on purpose and for the same
reason.

117. Id. at 542 (“Normally, a ‘judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the
analysis and impose a sentence within the range.’” (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522,
529 (2011) (plurality opinion))).
118. Id. at 547.
119. Id. at 542 (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435 (1987), abrogated by Peugh, 569 U.S.
530).
120. Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam) (“Our cases do not allow a
sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable.”);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (stating that the district court judge “may not presume
that the Guidelines range is reasonable”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“[T]he
sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should
apply.”).
121. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016). Similarly, the Rita Court
said: “Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own
reasoning.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. We know very little about the Commission’s reasoning, and it is clear
that the Commission simply relied on distorted calculations of past sentencing practice to set the
sentencing ranges of many guidelines. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 60–61 (describing and
criticizing the origins of many guidelines); Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 726–33
(analyzing Kimbrough’s failure to accurately describe the development of the Guidelines). Because of
this, it is unclear to me how a district court could know—let alone rely—on the Commission’s reasoning
about how to best balance the § 3553(a) factors.
122. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 547.
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Appellate Review

As noted above, the Booker remedy sought to ensure sentencing uniformity
by preserving appellate review of sentences. 123 Before Booker, appellate review
was designed to ensure that district judges correctly calculated the Guidelines
range and sentenced within that range. The SRA empowered the appellate
courts to overturn any sentence that “was imposed in violation of law or
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” 124
It further granted the power to overturn any sentence that was “outside the
range of the applicable sentencing guideline range” and was “unreasonable.” 125
The SRA was later amended to clarify that “the court of appeals shall review de
novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts” for any
sentence. 126
Booker rejected this de novo standard of review. It held that sentencing
decisions would be reviewed only for “reasonableness.” 127 According to the
remedial majority, appellate review would recover some sentencing uniformity
by allowing the circuit courts “to iron out sentencing differences” in the district
courts. 128 But the Booker remedial opinion was vague about how courts of
appeals would conduct reasonableness review. The dissenters expressed doubt
that the remedial majority had given appellate courts sufficient guidance about
how to conduct reasonableness review, 129 and the remedial majority’s claim that
that reasonableness review was “already familiar to appellate courts” 130 was not
supported by the evidence that it cited. 131
In the cases that followed Booker, the Court elaborated on what it meant
by reasonableness review. In so doing, the Court developed an appellate
doctrine that not only deviated from ordinary appellate principles 132 but also reentrenched the Guidelines. Those subsequent cases made clear that appellate
review is not about simply recapturing some semblance of uniformity. It is

123. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90, 118–19.
124. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2012 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)).
125. Id.
126. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). The amended
statute also directed appellate courts to determine whether a district court’s departure “is not justified
by the facts of the case.” Id. § 401(d)(1).
127. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–64 (2005) (remedial majority).
128. Id. at 263–64.
129. Id. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see also id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 261 (remedial majority).
131. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 9–10 (describing how reasonableness was not the
appellate standard used in many of the cases the remedial majority claimed it was and further
demonstrating that the reasonableness standard was not consistently applied when it was employed).
132. Id. at 18–28.
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about encouraging trial courts to follow the Guidelines and discouraging them
from making their own independent sentencing decisions.
The Court’s first attempt to clarify appellate review came only a year after
Booker. In Rita v. United States, 133 the Supreme Court said that appellate courts
may “presume” that sentences that follow the Guidelines are reasonable. In
other words, appellate courts are free to conduct a less searching review of
sentences that fall within the Guidelines’ advisory range.
A year after Rita, in Gall v. United States, 134 the Court declared that
“reasonableness review” has two stages. 135 First, appellate courts determine
whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable. According to Gall, a judge
commits a procedural error if she fails to calculate (or improperly calculates)
the Guidelines range, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen
sentence. Assuming that the judge properly calculated the Guidelines range, the
appellate court must then determine whether the sentence imposed was
substantively reasonable. Gall instructed the courts of appeals to “take into
account the totality of the circumstances,” 136 and it also suggested that this
review should be conducted no differently for sentences inside the Guidelines
range than those outside of the range. 137 But this even-handed language was
undercut elsewhere in the opinion. For example, in stating that appellate courts
should consider the totality of the circumstances, the Gall Court mentioned
only a single circumstance—“the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range.” 138 It also said it is “uncontroversial that a major departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” 139
More recent cases confirm that the Guidelines are intended to play a
substantial role in appellate review. In Peugh for example, the Court appeared
to admonish appellate courts to conduct this substantive review of sentencing
using the Guidelines range as a “meaningful benchmark.” 140 Indeed, the
Guidelines are the only substantive criteria that the Court has identified for
appellate review of sentences post-Booker. 141
133. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
134. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
135. Id. at 51.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 49 (“[T]he abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all
sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”).
138. Id. at 51.
139. Id. at 50.
140. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013).
141. See id. at 542 (speaking of appellate review in terms of the Guidelines, for example, “appellate
review for reasonableness using the Guidelines as a benchmark helps promote uniformity,” and
“[c]ourts of appeals may presume a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable, and they may further
‘consider the extent of the deviation’ from the Guidelines as part of their reasonableness review”
(citation omitted) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)).
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Perhaps most importantly, the Court has admitted that it uses “standards
for appellate review” in order to “encourage[] district courts to sentence within
the guidelines.” 142 And it seems to have worked. In both Peugh and MolinaMartinez v. United States, 143 the Court spoke in positive terms about how many
Guidelines sentences are imposed, leading the Court to conclude that there is
“considerable empirical evidence indicating that the Sentencing Guidelines
have the intended effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges.” 144
But pushing judges to impose sentences that are either within the
Guidelines—or very close to it—seems inconsistent with the logic of Booker.
The Booker Court leaned heavily on the idea of what is legally permitted or
legally authorized in developing the “advisory” Guidelines remedy. The
remedial majority said judicial fact-finding for advisory Guidelines did not
violate the Sixth Amendment because judges now had discretion to sentence
above the Guidelines range without making any factual findings. 145 This
discretion meant the advisory Guidelines range did not define the maximum
punishment—the statute did. 146
This argument—that district courts are authorized to sentence anywhere
within the statutory sentencing range despite having to calculate the Guidelines
range—might be persuasive if that were an accurate description of appellate
review in the post-Booker system. But it is not. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly treated the Guidelines differently for appellate review—reducing
the scrutiny of within-Guidelines sentences and requiring no explanation for
them, while at the same time requiring explanations for non-Guidelines
sentences and telling appellate courts to rely on the extent to which a sentence
deviates from the Guidelines in deciding whether the sentence is
unreasonable. 147
These developments suggest that the Court has calibrated appellate review
of federal sentences to serve as an end run around its Sixth Amendment right.
It has insisted that the post-Booker system complies with the Sixth Amendment
because district court judges have the discretion to sentence outside of the
Guidelines range. At the same time, it has permitted—if not encouraged—
appellate courts to curtail that discretion and funnel cases back within the
Guidelines range through their review practices. It is hard to understand why
such a system complies with the Sixth Amendment—if it violates the
Constitution to directly constrain sentencing authority through mandatory

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 547.
136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016).
Id. at 1346; Peugh, 569 U.S. at 543.
See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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guidelines, it should equally violate the Constitution to constrain that discretion
indirectly through reversal on appeal.
Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the Court sometimes frames its
Guidelines-centric appellate review as something that circuit courts are
permitted, but not required, to adopt. The most obvious example of this
permissive approach is Rita’s “presumption of reasonableness.” 148 After granting
certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether such a presumption was
permitted, the Court declined to resolve the split, saying that those circuits that
want to apply a presumption can, and those that do not want to need not. 149 The
Gall Court also suggested that Guidelines-centric appellate review was
permissive, rather than mandatory, in stating that appellate courts “may
consider the extent of the deviation” when assessing whether a non-Guidelines
sentence was unreasonable. 150 In more recent cases, the Court has suggested that
Guidelines-centric review is an intended, rather than merely permissive, feature
of appellate sentencing review. 151
Appellate courts appear to have taken the Supreme Court at its word, and
they have developed different appellate review standards. 152 The Court is well
aware of those different legal standards, and it has opted not to review them
and provide uniform appellate standards for the country. 153 It is difficult to
understand why the Court has allowed different appellate legal standards to
persist across the country—especially in light of the fact that it retained
appellate review after Booker in order to promote uniformity. The most likely
answer appears to be that the Court is willing to sacrifice uniformity of law—
giving up its ordinary role of resolving different legal rules in the circuits 154—
148. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–49 (2007).
149. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 21 (noting that the Rita Court “made the presumption
optional, stating that circuit courts ‘may’ choose to rely on the presumption and that the presumption
is ‘non-binding’”).
150. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
151. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013) (noting that the Court “aims to achieve
uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain
a meaningful benchmark through the process of appellate review”).
152. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 733–41 (collecting examples of different legal
standards in the courts of appeals); Anne Louise Marshall, How Do Federal Courts of Appeals Apply
Booker Reasonableness Review After Gall?, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1419, 1435–36 (2008) (same).
153. For example, the Court recently denied certiorari in a case that squarely presented two
appellate review circuit splits—the policy disagreement question and a question about how deferential
courts of appeals must be to non-Guidelines sentencing decisions. United States v. Demma, 948 F.3d
722, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 620 (6th Cir. 2020).
154. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 91, at 21 n.106 (noting how odd it is that the
Supreme Court refused to actually resolve the legal question in Rita and instead left appellate
courts free to adopt the presumption of reasonableness or not because “[c]ertiorari is usually granted
to resolve differences in the circuits; but Rita appears to endorse differing treatment in different
circuits” (quoting Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Rita: More for District Courts?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2007, 12:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/rita-morefor-district-courts [https://perma.cc/6UZW-F645]).
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in order to encourage more within-Guidelines sentences. These different legal
standards have had noticeable effects on district court behavior. In the Fifth
Circuit, which has adopted appellate review standards that push sentences
towards the Guidelines, 155 84.3% of sentences were imposed consistent with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 156 In the Second Circuit, which has adopted
appellate review standards that afford district courts more latitude, 157 only 55.3%
of sentences comply with the Guidelines. 158
Regardless whether the Court is requiring or merely encouraging
Guidelines-centric appellate review, such review means that a district court does
not have authority or discretion to sentence within the full statutory sentencing
range in all cases. If appellate courts are going to reverse them if they deviate
too much from the Guidelines, then district court judges do not have the
authority that they have been promised. If a government official is told that
another government actor will overrule their decision, does the first official
actually have the authority to take that action? That may be a somewhat
philosophical way to frame the question, but I still think that the answer is “no.”
If, for example, a prosecutor indicts a suspect without probable cause and a court
later dismisses the indictment, we would not say that the prosecutor had the
authority to indict without probable cause. To the contrary, we would say that
the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecutor was not authorized to
indict in the absence of probable cause.
To be sure, the post-Booker appellate review system has extended the
upper and lower limits of the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges. The Supreme
Court interprets the Commission’s data to mean that Guidelines ranges
continue to exert gravitational pull even on those sentences that are not
precisely within their range—as the range changes up or down, so do
sentences. 159 But it has not restored the authority of judges to impose any
sentence within the full statutory sentencing range. Appellate courts are
155. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 737–40.
156. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2018: FIFTH
CIRCUIT 12 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federalsentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/5c18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L35-JDCX]. This figure
includes “offenders whose sentences are determined to be either within the guideline range or outside
the guideline range and for which the court cited a reason on Part V of the Statement of Reasons
form (Departures Pursuant to the Guidelines Manual).” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 210 (2018) [hereinafter 2018
ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2E5P-2BKZ].
157. See Hessick, After Kimbrough, supra note 91, at 733–34.
158. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2018:
SECOND CIRCUIT 12 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/2c18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9856-ZTJJ].
159. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 543–44 (2013); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016).
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encouraged to reverse district judges’ sentences that are dramatically different
than the Guidelines range, unless they have identified factual circumstances
that uniquely warrant such a sentence.
In Booker, the Court thought that the inability of a sentencing judge to
impose the statutory maximum sentence in most cases triggered the Sixth
Amendment. 160 But the Court’s post-Booker cases have reintroduced that same
problem in its federal remedy. The Guidelines range may not set the outer
boundaries of sentencing authority in run-of-the-mill cases—appellate courts
will permit some minor deviations—but neither do the statutory maximum and
minimum sentences. To the extent that appellate courts will affirm a sentence
only in extraordinary or unique cases—that is, to the extent that “a major
departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one” 161—it remains a mystery why the facts that are necessary to support that
“significant justification” need not be found by a jury.
C.

Independent Sentencing Analysis

The Booker remedial opinion suggested that an “advisory” Guidelines
system would look a lot like sentencing before the SRA. Not only did the Court
rely on the history of judicial fact-finding in the aid of sentencing discretion to
justify its remedy, but it also laid out a vision for sentencing that resembled that
pre-SRA regime. The Booker opinion required judges to calculate the
Guidelines’ sentencing range (which required judges to find facts that were
identified ex ante). But the Booker remedy also required district court judges to
do more. It replaced the mandatory Guidelines regime with a statutory
balancing test—a test for which the Guidelines range was but one of several
factors. District court judges were instructed that the first step at sentencing
was to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range. But after that calculation,
judges were instructed to choose a sentence based on a balancing of all of the
§ 3553(a) factors. 162
Those § 3553(a) factors look an awful lot like traditional sentencing
discretion. The factors include “the nature and the circumstances of the
offense” 163 and factors that appear to restate the major theoretical justifications
for
punishment—retributivism,
deterrence,
incapacitation,
and
rehabilitation. 164 These factors are written in sufficiently broad terms that they
could support basically any sentence within the statutory range. What is more,
they clearly require the sentencing judge to make policy judgments about
appropriate sentences.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (merits majority).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60 (remedial majority).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
Id. § 3553(a)(2).
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But the Supreme Court’s post-Booker jurisprudence appears to have
abandoned any notion that judges must engage in this independent sentencing
analysis. The Court continues to say that district court judges may be reversed
for failing to calculate the Guidelines, calculating them incorrectly, or failing to
justify a decision to sentence outside of the Guidelines. 165 But it requires trial
judges to do absolutely nothing to incorporate any of the § 3553(a) factors other
than the Guidelines.
On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has made clear that
district court judges need not say anything about their sentencing decision other
than calculating the proper Guidelines range. Even when a defendant makes a
detailed argument about why the Guidelines would be too harsh in his case, the
Court will not require the judge to explain why those arguments do not affect
her § 3553(a) analysis.
That is precisely what happened in Rita. The district court failed to
address any of the defendant’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. Nor
did it provide any indication of how it balanced the § 3553(a) factors. All one
could glean from the district court’s “statement of reasons” for the sentence it
imposed was that the judge decided to impose a Guidelines sentence. 166 The
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence despite the fact that there was nothing in
the record to suggest that the judge had actually performed the independent
§ 3553(a) analysis required by Booker or why the judge did not accept the
defendant’s arguments in favor of a below-Guidelines sentence. 167
To be sure, Rita did not say that trial courts could treat the Guidelines as
mandatory. Although it affirmed the authority of courts of appeals to employ a
presumption of reasonableness, the Court took pains to point out that the
presumption was only an appellate presumption. 168 District courts were not
permitted to presume that the Guidelines range was reasonable. And the Court
reversed a sentence in a subsequent case when the district court stated on the
record that it was presuming that the Guidelines range was reasonable. 169 But
165. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
166. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 345 (2007).
167. Id. at 358–59. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed concern about
the lack of independent analysis in the district court’s statement of reasons. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). But he nonetheless voted to affirm the sentence in order to respect the discretion of the
district court judge since that discretion includes the discretion to impose a sentence within the
Guidelines. Id.
168. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
169. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009) (per curium). But at the same time that
the Rita Court advised district court judges that they may not presume that Guidelines ranges are
reasonable, it also insisted that the Commission, which writes the Guidelines, has institutional
advantages over the district courts when it comes to balancing the § 3553(a) factors to arrive at a
sentencing range. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–49. If district courts are not supposed to presume that the
Commission’s Guidelines ranges are reasonable, one wonders why the Court insisted on explaining
why the Commission is better situated to balance the § 3553(a) factors in typical cases.
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in affirming a sentence without any indication that an independent analysis
actually occurred, the Court signaled to district courts that appellate review
functions only to ensure that they calculate the Guidelines range and justify any
sentence outside of that range; it will not ensure that they undertake any
independent analysis when they sentence within the Guidelines.
If Rita signaled the first move away from Booker’s independent analysis
requirement, subsequent cases have dealt it a fatal blow. In Molina-Martinez,
for example, the Supreme Court reviewed another within-Guidelines sentence
where the district court provided no explanation for the sentence. 170 But while
the Rita Court was willing to assume that the district court judge had engaged
in an independent § 3553(a) analysis even though he had not explained the
sentence, the Molina-Martinez Court assumed that the judge had not engaged
in an independent § 3553(a) analysis. What is more, the Molina-Martinez Court
raised no objection to the failure to conduct that analysis. 171
Molina-Martinez involved a question of harmless error—namely whether
a defendant was entitled to remand when the trial court had miscalculated the
Guidelines range. Some appellate courts held that, because district courts were
free to sentence anywhere in the statutory range after Booker, a Guidelines
miscalculation alone was not enough to show “a reasonable probability” that the
defendant would have received a different sentence if the calculation had been
correct. 172 It seems entirely unremarkable to say that there is a “reasonable
probability” that defendants would have received a different sentence if there
was a calculation error. Misinformation at sentencing has long been deemed a
reason to reverse an otherwise lawful sentence. 173
Rather than simply relying on that precedent, the Court spoke about the
post-Booker role of the Guidelines in a manner that was troubling. The MolinaMartinez Court noted that the district court “said nothing specific about why it
chose the sentence it imposed” but instead “merely adopted the guideline
applications in the presentence investigation report.” 174 The Supreme Court
seemed to think that this was precisely what the Booker remedy was designed to
accomplish: “As intended, the Guidelines served as the starting point for the
170. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1344–45 (2016).
171. Id. at 1346–47 (“The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court thought
the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range. Judges may find that some
cases merit a detailed explanation of the reasons the selected sentence is appropriate. And that
explanation could make it clear that the judge based the sentence he or she selected on factors
independent of the Guidelines.”).
172. Id. at 1341–42.
173. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562
F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that defendants “have a due process right to be sentenced upon
information which is not false or materially incorrect” (quoting United States v. Pellerito, 918 F.2d
999, 1002 (1st Cir. 1990))); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1972) (reaffirming
Townsend).
174. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1347.
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sentencing and were the focal point for the proceedings that followed.” 175 The
idea that a judge merely imposing a Guidelines sentence without any
explanation is the “intended” outcome of a federal sentencing is disturbing. The
Booker remedy should not intend to have trial courts impose Guidelines
sentences; it should intend to have trial courts seriously consider not only the
Guidelines but also other information before arriving at an independent
sentencing decision.
The Molina-Martinez Court not only suggested that district court judges
have no obligation to explain their independent sentencing analysis, it also
suggested that they have no obligation to engage in that analysis themselves:
“District courts, as a matter of course, use the Guidelines range to instruct them
regarding the appropriate balance of the relevant federal sentencing factors.” 176
In other words, the Court believed that many (if not most) trial courts select
the Guidelines range only because the Commission believed that was an
appropriate sentence. Remarkably, when stating that only some judges believe
that the sentences they choose are appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines
range and that only some judges base the sentences they select on factors
independent of the Guidelines, the Molina-Martinez Court did not indicate that
the judges who are not engaging in an independent § 3553(a) analysis are
violating the Booker remedy. Nor did it explain how these practices are
consistent with the Court’s prior admonitions that district court judges may not
presume that the Guidelines range is a reasonable sentence. 177 These two failures
suggest that the Court cares only about the proper application of the
Guidelines; it does not care that judges are failing to conduct an independent
analysis of their sentencing decisions under § 3553(a). 178
In short, the Molina-Martinez Court assumed that the defendant in that
case, as well as many others, was sentenced only on the basis of the Guidelines
calculation and not on the basis of an independent § 3553(a) analysis. And yet
the Court indicated that sentences that are based only on a Guidelines
calculation are problematic only if there was an error in that calculation. This
strongly suggests that the Court is no longer committed to ensuring that postBooker sentencing includes an independent analysis of the appropriate sentence
using the § 3553(a) factors and that its previous admonitions to district courts
about not presuming that Guidelines sentences are reasonable were about style
rather than substance. Without the independent-analysis requirement, the
Booker remedy does nothing more than ensure judges have discretion to sentence
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 120 (collecting cases).
178. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342, 1345 (describing “the Guidelines’ central role in
sentencing” and mentioning only the Guidelines as something that the judge “must consult” when
imposing a sentence).
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outside the Guidelines, not that they use that discretion. And, as the previous
sections explained, the Supreme Court has also used its post-Booker cases to cut
back on that discretion.
III. SENTENCING, HISTORY, AND PRINCIPLES
From its inception, the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine has been
grounded in history. The Justices who initially recognized the right relied on
the importance of the jury during the Founding era to conclude that modern
sentencing practices violated the constitutional right to a jury trial. The
decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Alleyne are replete with references to opinions
of the Founding Fathers, old treatises, and pre-twentieth-century cases.
Although none of those sources specifically prohibit the modern sentencing
practices, the Justices emphasize how Founding-era sentencing practices are
different than modern practices. Those differences and the tendency of modern
practices to undermine the importance of the jury as an institution led the Court
to conclude that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the modern practices.
The Justices who fashioned the “advisory guidelines” remedy in Booker
also relied on history. Before legislatures began to create their structured
sentencing systems, there was a long tradition of allowing judges to select
sentences from within broad statutory ranges, and there was agreement that
judges could make whatever factual findings they wanted in order to exercise
that discretion. 179 Relying on statements from the merits majority and previous
Sixth Amendment cases affirming the constitutionality of judicial sentencing
discretion, the Booker remedial majority insisted that, so long as judges had
sentencing discretion, any factual findings they made to aid their exercise of
that discretion was constitutional. 180
But in subsequently “clarifying” the Booker remedy, the Supreme Court
has endorsed a system that bears a much greater resemblance to the mandatory
sentencing systems it struck down in Blakely and Cunningham than the
discretionary sentencing systems that existed prior to the rise of structured

179. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (“[B]road sentencing discretion, informed
by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.
270, 285 (2007) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233
(2005))); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481
(2000) (“We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to
exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in
imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the
individual case.”).
180. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
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sentencing. Indeed, many federal defendants receive no more protection from
the Sixth Amendment at sentencing than did the people who were sentenced
under the mandatory system that the Court purported to strike down in Booker.
The post-Booker cases seem to assume the constitutionality of the Booker
remedy so long as it is not entirely identical to any of the systems that have
been declared unconstitutional. 181 But if we use history not only as an
authorization of the advisory guidelines system but also as a benchmark against
which to assess that system, then it becomes clear that the advisory system—at
least as it is currently formulated—cannot be justified by historical practice. In
particular, the unwillingness to recognize district court authority to sentence
based on policy disagreement with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric
nature of appellate review, and the failure to ensure district courts are exercising
independent sentencing judgment are all highly inconsistent with historical
sentencing practice.
Not only have the Justices failed to use history as a limit on their
“subsequent calibration” of the Booker remedy, 182 but they have also failed to
ensure that the remedy actually protects the interests that the Sixth
Amendment serves—namely the liberty interests of criminal defendants and
the value of democratic input in individual criminal cases. Restoring some
limited judicial discretion does not obviously further either of the principles
behind the jury-trial right. It does not make it more difficult to punish
defendants nor does it ensure democratic input into the decision. And to the
extent that the Court has “recalibrated” the Booker remedy, it has done so in a
way that exacerbates these problems.
A.

History as a Justification and a Limit

The early American history of criminal punishment is difficult to study. 183
As a general matter, criminal practices often are not enshrined in published
opinions, and so those who wish to study the history of criminal punishment
must either rely on secondary accounts or look for original sources. The search
for original sources is complicated by the fact that the federal government had
very few criminal prosecutions, so one must look to the states. But state
practices were not uniform, historical state records can be difficult to locate, and
the effort required to collect and analyze documents from all of the states can
be time-consuming and difficult.

181. In Peugh, the Court stated that the Booker remedy has been “subsequently calibrated” in a
manner “intended to promote sentencing uniformity while avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation.”
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 550 (2013).
182. Id. at 549.
183. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 469 n.100 (discussing the difficulty of locating reliable
historical sources that describe sentencing practices).
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Even if the history surrounding early American sentencing practices were
easy to discover, modern sentencing cases present another difficulty. Many of
the modern sentencing practices that the Court must evaluate do not appear to
have existed in the Founding era. Because those practices did not exist, history
cannot definitively tell us whether the original understanding of the Sixth
Amendment would have permitted or prohibited the practice. Instead, the
Justices have to make their own decisions about what to permit and what to
prohibit, though they often do so while claiming the mantle of originalism.
One prominent example of this difficulty is the Court’s decision in Oregon
v. Ice. 184 Ice involved a state statute that regulated the imposition of consecutive
sentences for those defendants who were convicted of multiple crimes. The
Oregon statute required a judge to find one or more statutorily identified facts
in order to impose consecutive sentences. 185 If the judge did not find such a fact,
then the defendant was entitled to serve the sentences for those different crimes
concurrently (that is, at the same time).
Neither the majority nor the dissent identified any early American
practice that conditioned the imposition of consecutive sentences on judicial
fact-finding. And both agreed that states had historically left the question
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences to the judge, who could
decide the issues as a matter of her discretion. 186 The majority interpreted this
common-law practice of judicial discretion as evidence that the Oregon statute
did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. 187 But the dissenters interpreted it as
the opposite—that to the extent judges could make the decisions, their authority
to do so could not be conditioned on mandatory fact-finding. 188
Advisory guidelines pose the same methodological problem that occurred
in Ice. No advisory guidelines existed at the time that the Constitution was
written, and so we cannot know for sure whether the Founders would have
believed that such a sentencing system violated the Sixth Amendment. 189 While
the lack of historical analogue was seen as a reason not to deem a practice
unconstitutional in Ice, the Justices who formed the majority in Jones and
Apprendi took the opposite approach. They acknowledged that “the scholarship
of which we are aware does not show that a question exactly like this one was
184. 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
185. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.123 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of
the 80th Legis. Assemb.).
186. Ice, 555 U.S. at 168–69; id. at 174–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 168–70 (majority opinion).
188. Id. at 175–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. This problem of how to assess the constitutionality of a practice that did not exist at the
Founding is hardly limited to sentencing. It is a methodological challenge for originalism more
generally. As an example of how this is a methodological challenge for originalism, see the dueling
opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334,
358–71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), and id. at 371–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ever raised and resolved in the period before the framing,” 190 but ultimately
concluded that the fact that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of
a felony offense and a ‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during
the years surrounding our Nation’s founding” was a reason to deem those
modern practices unconstitutional. 191
Even though we do not have clear evidence that the original understanding
of the Sixth Amendment would have forbidden advisory sentencing
guidelines—that is, even though we do not have an authoritative Founding era
court opinion in which judges said such practices are unconstitutional—there
are still strong reasons to view the current Booker remedy with constitutional
suspicion. In particular, the three features of the remedy described in Part II—
the unwillingness to recognize district court authority to sentence based on
policy disagreement with the Guidelines, the Guidelines-centric nature of
appellate review, and the failure to ensure district courts are exercising
independent sentencing judgment—look incredibly different than the historical
sentencing practices that supposedly justify them. And, as described more fully
in the next section, an advisory guidelines regime fails to protect the principles
underlying the Sixth Amendment. 192
Let us first examine the Court’s unwillingness to state that district court
judges may sentence outside of the Guidelines based only on policy
disagreement. 193 This unwillingness is impossible to square with the historical
practice that the Court relied on to fashion the Booker remedy. Specifically, the
Booker remedy relied on our history of broad judicial sentencing discretion. As
the Booker Court said, “when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a
specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.” 194 Judges enjoyed that
discretion because sentencing was thought to be a circumstance-driven and
defendant-specific endeavor. Judicial fact-finding at sentencing was not limited
to specific sentencing factors because it was widely believed that those facts that
ought to increase or decrease sentences could not be identified ex ante. 195
Next, let us consider the Court’s appellate review doctrine after Booker. 196
It fares even worse when compared to historical practice. Before the SRA was
passed, appellate review of federal criminal sentences was nonexistent in most

190. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).
191. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (emphasizing that, as a general rule, there
should be no doubt as to what judgment should be given if a defendant is convicted).
192. See infra Section III.B.
193. See supra Section II.A.
194. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
195. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 474–75.
196. See supra Section II.B.
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cases. 197 So long as a sentence was within the range authorized by statutes,
appellate courts would refuse to hear any appeal from a judge’s sentencing
decision. This refusal was based on a federal statute passed in 1891, which was
generally understood to have stripped appellate courts of jurisdiction to hear
appeals from federal criminal sentences. 198 Before that statute was passed,
federal appellate courts “had power to correct harsh sentences on appeal.” 199 The
states also generally declined to provide appellate review of sentences within
the authorized statutory range. A mid-twentieth-century review of the matter
found fewer than a dozen states that authorized appeals from sentencing
decisions. 200 Those states which permitted appellate review of sentencing did so
under quite deferential standards. Appellate review basically served only as a
check on excessively harsh sentences. 201
To be sure, there were exceptions to the federal appellate courts’ refusal
to hear appeals from sentences within the statutory range. Appellate courts
would reverse a sentence within the statutory range in cases where the
sentencing courts based their decisions on “material misinformation [or] upon
constitutionally impermissible considerations,” such as race. 202 Such sentences
were said to violate defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless whether they
were authorized by statute. 203 In addition, several circuit courts held that
197. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.”);
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“[T]he general proposition [is] that once it is
determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed,
appellate review is at an end.”).
198. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 197–98 n.3.
199. Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 259 (1962) (“Prior to 1891, the old
circuit courts had power to correct harsh sentences on appeal; and the power was exercised. But the
language of the 1891 statute creating the new appellate courts was thought to ‘repeal’ that grant of
authority; and since 1891 federal upper courts have generally denied themselves any power to revise
sentences.” (footnotes omitted)).
200. Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE
L.J. 1453, 1453 (1960) (noting that eleven states provided some form of review of criminal sentences).
201. See, e.g., State v. Kunz, 259 A.2d 895, 901–03 (N.J. 1969) (noting a defendant’s right to appeal
from a sentence that is “manifestly excessive”); Montalto v. State, 199 N.E. 198, 200 (Ohio Ct. App.
1935) (stating that “the rule generally applied may be that a reviewing court will not disturb a sentence
as excessive, provided it is within the limits prescribed by law,” but on the other hand, “if the sentence
appears to be very much greater than the proper protection of society demands, and the record justifies
the conclusion that the sentence was probably the result of prejudice rather than the exercise of a sound
discretion, a reviewing court has the power to relieve against the excessiveness of the sentence”).
202. United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New
“Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19 (1997); Appellate Review of
Sentences, supra note 199, at 259 (“A sentence will be vacated when a reviewing tribunal finds that it is
based upon information which is so clearly incorrect or upon criteria so improper as to constitute a
violation of the defendant’s right to due process.”).
203. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948); see also United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447–49 (1972) (reaffirming Townsend).
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sentencing judges could not impose the statutory maximum punishment based
solely on the crime of conviction. Those courts said district court judges were
required to individualize sentences based on the facts or circumstances of the
defendant’s offense and personal background. 204 The circuits justified their
intervention in sentencing decisions on the theory that, when the sentencing
court does not actually exercise its discretion when imposing a sentence, then
“the appellate court does not usurp the discretion vested in the district court
when it reviews the sentence.” 205
Importantly, even these modest appellate limits on district court
sentencing authority often could not be enforced. As a practical matter,
appellate courts were unable to review the reasons behind many sentencing
decisions because sentencing courts were not required to explain the sentences
that they imposed. 206 When lower courts did not explain their sentences,
appellate courts had little or no ability to determine whether the sentencing
judges exercised their discretion in a prohibited way.
To put a finer point on it, it is extremely difficult to understand why the
Court believes that this Guidelines-centric appellate review satisfies the Sixth
Amendment. The only real justification that the Court has given for the Booker
remedy is that judicial fact-finding in aid of judicial sentencing discretion has
historically been understood to stand outside of the Sixth Amendment. But the
appellate review that the Court has created in its post-Booker cases looks nothing
like the sort of appellate scrutiny that criminal sentences received in the
discretionary sentencing systems that the Court uses as a historical analogy for
its post-Booker advisory system. In those discretionary systems, appellate review
was limited to a very narrow set of circumstances and it was exceedingly
deferential. 207 Outside of those narrow circumstances, what sentence to impose
and why were questions left to the trial judge, leading to the perception that
sentencing courts could impose sentences for any reason or no reason at all. 208
There can be no real dispute that appellate review in the post-Booker
system does not resemble appellate review in discretionary sentencing regimes:
204. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 970–71 (6th Cir.
1971); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143–44 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McCoy, 429
F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
205. United States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212, 220 (7th Cir. 1988).
206. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 11, at 2–3 (noting that due process protections, including a
statement of reasons for government action, that apply to agency action appear not to govern federal
sentencing).
207. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
208. See O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 11, at 2–3 (“[T]here is no requirement that the sentence
have any rational basis whatsoever.”); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing
Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 61 (2006) (“From the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth
century, sentencing judges enjoyed almost unfettered discretion. . . . Sentencing judges were free to
select any sentence within the range for any reason or no reason at all.”).
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post-Booker appellate review exists to push district court judges to sentence
within or close to the Guidelines range, rather than merely to correct excessively
harsh sentences. If anything, post-Booker appellate review looks like a slightly
watered-down version of the pre-Booker appellate review: district court judges
will be reversed if they fail to make required factual findings and calculate the
correct Guidelines range. And while appellate courts will permit minor
variations from the Guidelines range, they will demand additional explanation
and fact-finding before permitting sentences that are significantly different
than the Guidelines range. Indeed, many appellate reversals are of sentences
that appellate judges deem too lenient 209—a stark contrast with historical
appellate review, which was all about reversing sentences that were too harsh. 210
Finally, let us examine the Court’s failure to ensure that district court
judges are engaged in any independent sentencing analysis. 211 That failure is
also entirely inconsistent with historical practice. It is only if the sentencing
judge takes seriously her responsibility to engage in a § 3553(a) analysis that
post-Booker sentencing resembles the broad discretionary systems that the
Court tells us do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. A judge who engages in
the § 3553(a) analysis must not only engage in the fact-finding required by the
Guidelines, but she also must inquire more broadly into the facts and
circumstances of the crime and the character and background of the offender.
The judge must decide whether the Guidelines sentence is longer than
necessary to protect the public from future crimes against the defendant, or
whether the Guidelines sentence is long enough given the seriousness of the
offense. These broad judgment calls are precisely the sort of nonfactual findings
that the Cunningham Court indicated were the difference between a system that
triggers the Sixth Amendment and one that does not. 212
In abandoning the independent-analysis requirement, the post-Booker
cases have made judicial discretion, rather than individualized sentencing, the
touchstone of the federal sentencing system. So long as a judge has the authority
to engage in an independent analysis, it does not matter whether she actually
engages in that analysis. Put differently, it is the availability of judicial
209. For example, in 2018 appellate courts affirmed sentencing decisions in appeals by defendants
71.3% of the time and only revered in slightly more than 10% of appeals. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 156, at 180 tbl. A-2. The remaining appeals had mixed outcomes; they were
reversed in part and affirmed in part. But when the government (as opposed to the defendant) appealed
a district court sentencing decision, the outcome was dramatically different—only 24% of sentences
were affirmed and more than 70% of sentences were reversed. Id. at 183 tbl. A-3. While there are clearly
far more appeals by defendants than by the government, see id. at 180 tbl. A-2, 183 tbl. A-3 (recording
3,224 appeals by defendants as compared to twenty-five appeals by the government), these figures
demonstrate that appellate courts are far more likely to reverse a sentence that the government says is
too lenient than a sentence that a defendant says is too harsh.
210. See supra note 201.
211. See supra Section II.C.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70.
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discretion, rather than the exercise of that discretion, that the post-Booker Court
has secured for defendants.
A judge who fails to engage in an independent § 3553(a) analysis—that is,
a judge who is not engaging in individualized sentencing—is continuing to
apply the Guidelines no differently than in the pre-Booker system. When
individual judges mechanically apply the Guidelines, and when litigants are told
that arguments about why a Guidelines sentence is flawed are better directed to
the Commission rather than to sentencing judges, 213 then the defendants in
those cases are in the same position as defendants under mandatory Guidelines.
Put simply, the Guidelines are mandatory in their cases.
Indeed, allowing district court judges to avoid any independent sentencing
analysis also runs afoul of historical practice. As noted above, one of the few
times that appellate courts would reverse a sentence on appeal was if a judge
explicitly refused to engage in any individualized sentencing analysis and
instead imposed a sentence based on the crime of conviction alone. 214 Judges
who do not engage with arguments about why a non-Guidelines sentence is
appropriate seem no different than judges who refused to individualize
sentences prior to the SRA. Given that the reason judges were historically
permitted to engage in fact-finding was that the facts were deemed necessary to
individualize sentences, 215 the current failure to require individualization seems
impossible to square with historical practice.
B.

Advisory Guidelines and Sixth Amendment Principles

In addition to being at odds with sentencing history, advisory guidelines
do not advance the two major interests that the Sixth Amendment protects—
the liberty interests of criminal defendants and democratic input in individual
criminal cases. 216 The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants by
213. For example, the Seventh Circuit has declared that, when faced with defense arguments about
why a Guidelines sentence is inappropriate, if a judge is “not persuaded by the argument, it may pass
over it in silence.” United States v. Schmitz, 717 F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2013). The court noted that
while judges may address arguments that challenge the policy wisdom of a Guidelines sentence,
“[a]rguments urging a reexamination of a particular guideline are more naturally addressed to the
Sentencing Commission.” Id.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 202–05.
215. See Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 474–75.
216. The individual right is protected in the text of the Sixth Amendment, which reads: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The democratic input is made clear in Article III, which does not frame the right in individual terms:
“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held
in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. For more on the
Article III role for the jury, see Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND.
L.J. 397, 446 (2009); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 195–97 (2005); Steven A.
Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1705–06 (2000).
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making it more difficult to convict them of a crime. 217 It accomplishes this by
requiring a trial (which is expensive) in front of a jury (who may be more
skeptical of government power than public officials) and by requiring that the
defendant’s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (a relatively high
standard of proof). The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine further protects
defendants by ensuring that these protections apply to all facts that, by law,
increase punishment. 218
The Sixth Amendment does more than just secure individual rights for
defendants; it also serves a structural purpose. It allocates certain powers to the
jury—the power to convict—and those powers serve as a check on the three
branches of government. 219 Criminal juries obviously serve as a check on the
executive’s power to enforce the law—after all, the executive cannot punish
anyone without convincing a jury to convict—but they also can limit the
legislature’s power by refusing to convict under unjust laws. 220 And while judges
have the power to enter the judgment of conviction, they cannot do so in the
absence of a guilty verdict from the jury or a guilty plea from the defendant.
The structural check provided by the Sixth Amendment is important, the
Founding generation explained, because it provides a democratic check on
government officials. 221 Voting provides a check at the wholesale level—
allowing voters to select and reject the officials who make and enforce our laws.
Juries provide a check at the retail level—allowing voters to accept or reject
government decisions to punish in individual criminal cases. 222 That retail-level
check is extremely important for democracy. Thomas Jefferson once said that,
if he had to choose between democratic participation in the legislature and
democratic participation in the judicial branch in the form of juries, he would
choose juries. 223

217. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245–46 (1999) (discussing Sir William Blackstone
and other sources for the importance of the jury as an individual right).
218. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty
for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
219. F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 ALA. L. REV.
163, 182 (2019).
220. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 50–61 (2003) (explaining how the jury’s power to nullify
served “as a potent check on the legislature”).
221. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004).
222. See generally Appleman, supra note 216, at 405–14 (providing historical support for the
democratic importance of the jury right).
223. In July of 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Were I called upon to decide whether the people
had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them
out of the Legislative.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). The majority in Blakely cited this
statement from Jefferson as support for its contention that the “jury trial is meant to ensure [the
people’s] control in the judiciary.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
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In theory, both of these concepts—protecting defendants and providing a
democratic check—are important. In practice however, modern American juries
rarely serve either purpose. Plea bargains, rather than jury trials, are the
dominant method of resolving cases. 224 Fewer than five percent of defendants
convicted of a crime in this country are found guilty by a jury—and that number
is even lower in some jurisdictions. 225 The remaining defendants plead guilty.
To be sure, things would be worse in the absence of the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine. Without the Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine,
legislatures could make jury trials even less important. They could create an
entire criminal code that applied only at sentencing and limit the right to a jury
and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt only to trivial allegations of
wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court explained in Blakely, without the Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine,
the jury need only find whatever facts the legislature chooses to label
elements of the crime, and that those it labels sentencing factors—no
matter how much they may increase the punishment—may be found by
the judge. This would mean, for example, that a judge could sentence a
man for committing murder even if the jury convicted him only of
illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it—or of making an illegal
lane change while fleeing the death scene. 226
Not only could judges make these other determinations, but they could use a
lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine gives defendants the right—
at least on paper—to demand a jury trial on every disputed fact, including those
that the legislature would rather label sentencing factors. 227 And if they decide
to plea bargain, then in theory the defendants will be able to negotiate a better
224. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice today is
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
225. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 14 (2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-thesixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V4WM-GC4Z] (“[I]n recent years fewer than 3% of federal criminal defendants chose to take advantage
of [the right to trial,] one of the most crucial constitutional rights.”); John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal
Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trialand-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/Q5F7-XBCH] (reporting that only two percent
of federal defendants who were convicted went to trial, and reporting similar numbers for states: “In
2017 – the year with the most recent data – jury trials accounted for fewer than 3% of criminal
dispositions in 22 jurisdictions with available data, including Texas (0.86%), Pennsylvania (1.11%),
California (1.25%), Ohio (1.27%), Florida (1.53%), North Carolina (1.66%), Michigan (2.12%) and New
York (2.91%).”); see also Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
226. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
227. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
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bargain because treating sentencing facts as elements gives them more
bargaining power. 228 In practice, however, we find that prosecutors have
overwhelming leverage, defendants have insufficient information, and real
people do not behave as economic models predict. 229
That the Supreme Court allows defendants to so easily waive their Sixth
Amendment rights in plea bargaining significantly diminishes the role of juries
as a democratic check on public officials. And because the Court allows
prosecutors to pressure and threaten defendants to waive their right to a jury
trial—behavior that the courts would never permit if other constitutional rights
were at risk 230—the Sixth Amendment sentencing right does not provide much
protection for individual defendants either. To be clear, these are problems
associated with the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine, not its sentencing
doctrine. But the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine effectively renders its Sixth
Amendment sentencing doctrine moot.
The irony of plea bargaining undermining the Sixth Amendment
sentencing doctrine is that the remedial majority in Booker relied on the
prevalence of plea bargaining in refusing to remedy the Sixth Amendment
violation by requiring the prosecution to prove all of the facts required by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 231 The
remedial majority thought that plea bargaining over sentencing facts would lead
to less uniformity in sentencing, and it was probably correct that sentencing
disparity would result from plea bargaining over sentencing facts. But again,
that is a problem with the Court’s plea-bargaining doctrine, which largely defers
to prosecutorial charging decisions and which does not contemplate any
significant judicial review of plea-bargaining negotiations. 232 Consequently,
plea bargaining already results in all sorts of disparity, and this disparity has
significant effects on sentencing decisions. 233
Irony aside, it is hard to understand how the Court could possibly seek to
strike a balance between the right to a jury trial and a desire to achieve uniform
228. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
(1992).
229. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011).
230. RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 187–88 (2019); see also Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801,
801 (2003) (observing that the criminal waiver doctrine does not apply to the waiver of many criminal
rights, including the right to a jury trial).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 83–85.
232. E.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124–25 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 455–57 (1962).
233. See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013) (presenting empirical
evidence to demonstrate that prosecutors’ discretionary charging, plea bargaining, and fact-finding
cause significant sentencing disparity).
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results in the criminal justice system. Juries are not well designed to provide
uniformity; they are made up of laypeople who sit for only one case at a time.
And juries have long been criticized for their lack of predictability and
uniformity. 234 When it comes to jury verdicts, we see inconsistent results not
only across juries but sometimes even within a single jury’s verdicts. 235
But the question we need to ask is not whether the Court can balance
uniformity and the right to a jury trial. Given the path that the Court took in
Booker, attempting that balance is unavoidable. Instead, we must ask how much
the Justices can (and should) tilt that balance in favor of uniformity. At present,
it seems as though the Court may be on a path that tilts the balance just short
of reinstating mandatory Guidelines. 236 But perhaps that tilt could be arrested—
and perhaps some modicum of balance could be restored—if we assess the
Court’s “subsequent calibration” of the remedy against the backdrop of the
principles underlying the right to a jury trial.
Even without looking at how the Court has privileged the Guidelines in
its post-Booker cases, it is important to note that restoring judicial discretion
does not obviously further either of the principles behind the jury trial right. It
does not make it more difficult to punish defendants—judges can impose
harsher sentences without finding any additional facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. Nor is there is any democratic input into the sentencing decisions in
individual cases because juries are excluded.
One could argue that increased judicial sentencing discretion is likely to
lead to more carefully drafted criminal codes with narrower sentencing ranges—
a result that could inject democratic input into sentencing decisions during the
legislative process. The people, through their elected legislators, determine
what punishment range ought to correspond to a particular crime. Because the
voting public knows that a judge is empowered to impose the maximum
sentence upon a finding of guilt, so the argument goes, legislatures will only
enact statutes with maximum authorized punishment that is appropriate upon
234. See Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the
Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 394–406 (2018) (collecting sources).
235. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111
HARV. L. REV. 771, 777–81 (1998) (describing inconsistent verdicts in cases involving multiple-count
indictments and multiple-defendant cases).
236. The following language from Peugh suggests as much:
Our Sixth Amendment cases have focused on when a given finding of fact is required to make
a defendant legally eligible for a more severe penalty. Our ex post facto cases, in contrast, have
focused on whether a change in law creates a “significant risk” of a higher sentence; here,
whether a sentence in conformity with the new Guidelines is substantially likely. The Booker
remedy was designed, and has been subsequently calibrated, to exploit precisely this
distinction: it is intended to promote sentencing uniformity while avoiding a Sixth
Amendment violation.
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 550 (2013).
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a bare finding of guilt rather than based upon additional aggravating factors. 237
Instead, aggravating factors will be identified as elements of new, aggravated
crimes with harsher sentencing ranges. And those elements will have to be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
But there are reasons to doubt that judicial sentencing discretion will lead
to the legislative choices described above. Even before the rise of structured
sentencing, plenty of states enacted statutes with broad sentencing ranges that
empowered judges rather than juries. 238
Even if we were to assume that (a) judicial sentencing discretion is likely
to lead to more carefully drafted criminal codes with narrower sentencing ranges
and (b) such a criminal code would empower juries, an “advisory” system
changes that dynamic. “Advisory” sentencing systems actually incentivize
legislatures to move important factual determinations out of the domain of
juries and into the domain of judges. So long as legislatures are willing to endure
some deviation from their judges, they are able to relabel elements as
“sentencing factors” and dramatically increase the punishment associated with
those facts by having judges make factual findings at sentencing.
“Advisory” sentencing guidelines also make voters less likely to check their
legislatures. Imagine, for example, a state that punishes burglary by up to ten
years’ imprisonment, but it “advises” judges that they should only impose a fiveyear sentence unless the defendant possessed a gun during the burglary, and
then it also makes reversal on appeal far more likely if the judge does not find
that the defendant possessed a gun. The voting public knows that a judge has
the authority to impose ten years in prison based only on a defendant’s
commission of a burglary. But they also know that judges are probably only
going to impose a ten-year sentence on a burglar if he also possessed a gun. The
voting public will likely approve of such legislation if they think that burglars
should receive five-year sentences, and armed burglars should receive ten-year
sentences. That some unarmed burglars may receive ten-year sentences does
not change the fact that this “advisory” sentencing system has effectively
recategorized an element of a crime that ought to be found by a jury (possession
of a gun) as a sentencing factor that will be found by a judge.
Importantly, to the extent that the Court has “subsequently calibrated” the
Booker remedy, 239 it has done so in a way that exacerbates these problems. It has
failed to clarify whether district courts have unfettered authority to sentence
outside of the Guidelines range based only on their policy views, encouraged
237. Variations of this argument have been offered in Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential
Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1487 (2001), and Hessick & Berry, supra note 7, at 473–74.
238. Texas, for example, has created statutory sentencing ranges of five to ninety-nine years for
first-degree felonies and two to twenty years for second-degree felonies. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.32(a), 12.33(a) (Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.).
239. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 550.
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appellate courts to curtail sentencing discretion and funnel cases within the
Guidelines range, and refused to require district judges to engage in any
independent sentencing analysis. Each of these developments make district
court judges more likely to impose Guidelines sentences. And the more likely
judges are to follow the Guidelines, the more of an incentive there is to move
important sentencing distinctions out of statutory elements and into the
Guidelines.
One might argue that a defendant in an advisory system is no worse off
than a defendant in a system of broad judicial sentencing discretion; in the latter
system, a judge is unlikely to impose the maximum sentence on defendants
unless there are some aggravating facts present. The advisory system might
even be preferable, one might argue, because it identifies ex ante the facts that
defendants ought to dispute at sentencing and it better ensures that defendants
are treated similarly to one another. But those arguments do not explain why
judges ought to be finding those sentencing facts, rather than juries; nor do those
arguments address the fundamental Sixth Amendment objection—that advisory
sentencing systems are designed precisely to avoid having juries decide those
facts that the legislature has identified as deserving of additional punishment.
Indeed, giving this advisory system a constitutional pass only makes sense
if you actually want these advisory sentencing facts to drive sentences and if
you also want to avoid juries.
CONCLUSION
The right that the Supreme Court first recognized in Apprendi was very
important. Legislatures across the country had adopted structured sentencing
decisions that moved consequential decisions from the guilt phase of a criminal
case to the sentencing phase—a move that deprived defendants of both their
right to a jury trial and their right to have facts found beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Despite the importance of the Sixth Amendment sentencing right, the
exercise of jury-trial rights has not actually increased. Part of the problem is
that the Supreme Court is unwilling to revisit its plea-bargaining doctrine,
which empowers prosecutors to pressure defendants into guilty pleas and which
shields that pressure from judicial review. But the Sixth Amendment sentencing
doctrine itself—in particular the remedy that the Court adopted in Booker—is
also partially to blame. That remedy, especially as it has been modified in more
recent cases, substantially undercuts the right itself and permits practices that
appear to be forbidden by the early cases establishing the right.
The Court should, once again, recalibrate its Sixth Amendment sentencing
remedy in a way that does not continue to privilege the Guidelines. It should
look to historical practice and the interests underlying the Sixth Amendment to
further refine the Booker remedy. In particular, it should acknowledge that
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district courts are fully empowered to sentence outside of the Guidelines range
based only on policy disagreement, it should scale back appellate review of
sentencing decisions so that appellate courts only reverse excessively harsh
sentences, and it should require district court judges to explicitly grapple with
sentencing factors other than the Guidelines. Until and unless the Court does
so, the remedy for Sixth Amendment sentencing violations will continue to
undermine the Sixth Amendment sentencing right.
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